

APOLOGY 30B 2-4: SOCRATES, MONEY, AND THE GRAMMAR OF ΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ

Abstract: The framework of this paper is a defence of Burnet's construal of *Apology* 30b 2-4. Socrates does not claim, as he is standardly translated, that virtue makes you rich, but that virtue makes money and everything else good for you. This view of the relation between virtue and wealth is paralleled in dialogues of every period, and a sophisticated development of it appears in Aristotle. My philological defence of the philosophically preferable translation extends recent scholarly work on εἶναι in Plato and Aristotle to γίγνεσθαι, which is the main verb in the disputed sentence. When attached to a subject, both verbs make a complete statement on their own, but a statement that is further completable by adding a complement. The important point is that the addition of a complement does not change the meaning of the verb from existence to the copula. Proving this is a lengthy task which takes me into some of the deeper reaches of Platonic and Aristotelian ontology, and into discussion of whether Greek ever acquired a verb that corresponds to modern verbs of existence. I conclude that even when later authors such as Philo Judaeus, Sextus Empiricus and Plotinus debate what we naturally translate as issues of existence, none of the verbs they use (εἶναι, ὑπάρχειν, ὑφεστηκέναι) can be said to have existential meaning.

THE PROBLEM

Οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία.

THIS sentence is standardly translated, 'Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue money and all other good things come to human beings in both private and public life', *vel sim.* The objection is philosophical. Nowhere else does Plato represent Socrates as promising that virtue will make you rich. Quite the contrary, the promise is that virtue will make you happy whatever fortune brings (*Gorg.* 507c-508b, 522ce, 527cd), for whether you fare well or ill is completely determined by the good or bad character of your soul (*Prot.* 313a, *Gorg.* 470e). And this promise is backed by a warning: the more worldly possessions you have, the more unhappy you will be if you do not know how to use them for the good of your soul (*Meno* 87e-89a, *Euthyd.* 280b-281e; the idea is still going strong at *Laws* 2.661ad). If Socrates was in the habit of promoting virtue as a money-maker, it would be disingenuous of him to say that his words do not recommend pursuing virtue *in order to* make money. Strictly speaking, they do not – but he would know that lots of his listeners would take them that way unless he explicitly corrected a misapprehension which, if left uncorrected, would bring him many more followers.

Some have thought to make the usual translation respectable by quoting the Bible. The first to invoke 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things [*sc.* food, drink, clothing, etc.] shall be added unto you' (*Matthew* 6:33) was Sir Richard Livingstone.¹ The same comparison with Jesus turns up in the recent huge commentary on the *Apology* by De Strycker and Slings.² But the Bible, as so often, cuts both ways: 'A rich man shall hardly [i.e. with difficulty] enter into the kingdom of heaven' (*Matthew* 19:23) is much closer to the Socrates we meet elsewhere in Plato. This is a case where philology should take its cue from philosophy.

¹ *Portrait of Socrates*, being the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* of Plato in an English translation (that of Benjamin Jowett, 3rd edn, Oxford 1892) with introd. and notes (Oxford 1938) 26.

² *Plato's Apology of Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary*, ed. and completed from the papers of the late E. De Strycker, SJ by S.R. Slings (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 137, Leiden, New York and Cologne 1994) 140.

ALTERNATIVE TRANSLATIONS

Long ago, when contributing to a collection of essays on Socrates edited by Gregory Vlastos, I complained that the standard translation cannot be right. I translated χρήματα more generally as ‘valuables’ and spoke of ‘the Socratic challenge to common notions of what is a valuable possession’.³ My idea was that Plato meant to leave the sentence open to both a Socratic and a non-Socratic understanding of what counts as a valuable possession, allowing readers to choose for themselves between a philosophical and a non-philosophical interpretation. Vlastos as editor was not convinced, but he printed me nonetheless. He was right not to be convinced.

πλοῦτος (‘wealth’, ‘riches’) is the word that lends itself to that kind of figurative extension, not the mundane χρήματα (‘money’). Socrates’ companion Antisthenes discourses on ‘wealth (πλοῦτος) in the soul’ at Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.34-44. At the end of Plato’s *Phaedrus* (279c) Socrates prays, ‘May I consider the wise man rich (πλούσιος). As for gold, let me have as much as a temperate man can bear and carry with him.’ Similarly, at *Republic* 7.521a he speaks of the philosopher rulers as those who are really rich (τῶι ὄντι πλούσιοι), not in gold, but in the wealth that the happy must have: a good and wise life.⁴ The pseudo-Platonic *Eryxias* does extend the word χρήματα to cover anything useful (χρήσιμον), including skills (402de), but it takes lengthy argument (cued no doubt by *Rep.* 8.559c 3-4) to make this intelligible, and Plato was dead by the time the dialogue was written.

Even though Vlastos was not convinced, he sympathized with my worry, and later came to endorse a solution we had both shamefully overlooked.⁵ The solution had been sitting there all along in Burnet’s commentary of 1924:

‘It is goodness that makes money and everything else good for men.’ The subject is χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἅπαντα and ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is predicate. We must certainly not render ‘from virtue comes money’! This is a case where interlaced order may seriously mislead.⁶

So too, without reference to Burnet, Léon Robin’s French translation in the Pléiade series: ‘mais c’est le vrai mérite qui fait bonne la fortune’.⁷ But this, like Burnet’s rendering, seems not to have caught on. More recently, Luc Brisson in the Flammarion series translates as usual, but in his note to the passage offers a non-standard interpretation (borrowed from a *distinct* point in Vlastos): virtue does get you money, but this is of minor importance compared to the perfection of your soul, which Socrates has just said should be your primary goal.⁸

The story in Germany is much the same. I have found only two exceptions to the rule. Kurt Hildebrandt in his ominously titled *Platons Vaterländische Reden: Apologie, Criton, Menexenos*,⁹ translates as follows: ‘Nicht aus dem Gelde Tüchtigkeit entsteht, sondern aus Tüchtigkeit Schätze und alle andere Güter der Menschen, in der Familie und im Staate’. The switch from ‘Gelde’ to ‘Schätze’ is a version of my own youthful indiscretion. Later, again with-

³ M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Virtues in action’, in Gregory Vlastos (ed.), *The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays* (New York 1971) 210.

⁴ Cf. the contrast between mortal gold, which the Guardians of the ideal city are not allowed to possess, and the divine gold they have in their souls from the gods (*Rep.* 3.416e-417a), a contrast echoed later as their being not poor (save financially) but by nature rich (8.547b).

⁵ Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge 1991) 219 with n.73.

⁶ John Burnet, *Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito*, ed. with notes (Oxford 1924) 124.

⁷ *Oeuvres de Platon* 1 (Paris 1956).

⁸ *Platon: Apologie de Socrate, Criton*, Traductions inédites, introductions et notes par Luc Brisson (Paris 1997) n.173, referring to Vlastos (n.5) 303-8. A similar account of the traditional translation in Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *Plato’s Socrates* (New York and Oxford 1994) 20 with n.33.

⁹ Leipzig 1936. The ominous title heralds Hildebrandt’s long introduction, where he enlists both Socrates and Plato for the Fascist cause.

out reference to Burnet, Konrad Gaiser construed ἀγαθὰ as ‘dem Sinne nach prädikativ’ and offered this translation: ‘Nicht aus dem Geld wird einem ἀρετή, sondern aus ἀρετή werden Geld und die anderen Dinge, insofern sie ἀγαθὰ sind, für die Menschen, für jeden einzelnen wie für die Gesamtheit.’¹⁰ All honour to the French and German scholars who in their different ways have manifested unease with the standard translation.

Sadly, although there have been numerous English-language translators of the *Apology* since Burnet’s edition (all of whom will, if they had sense, have worked with Burnet to hand), for a long time they ignored his advice. To my knowledge, only in one short article and a quotation here and there could his influence be discerned. An early example is F.M. Cornford, who in his delightful little book *Before and After Socrates* (1932) found occasion to quote a lengthy chunk of the *Apology*, including this: ‘Goodness does not come from wealth, but it is goodness that makes wealth or anything else, in public or private life, a thing of value for man.’¹¹ In 1973 John Hammond Taylor published a brief article advocating this construal.¹² A more recent book to quote 30b 2–4 in Burnet’s translation is C.D.C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato’s Apology of Socrates*.¹³ But of late the situation has changed. Suddenly we have two complete translations of the *Apology* which follow Burnet on the crucial point.

(a) John Cooper, editor of the new Hackett *Plato: Complete Works*,¹⁴ reprinted G.M.A. Grube’s translation of the *Apology*,¹⁵ but with the disputed sentence put as follows: ‘Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively.’ Grube’s original rendering, a version of the standard translation, was relegated to a footnote as ‘an alternative’. (b) In the same year, Michael Stokes brought out a text and translation of the *Apology* in which he adopted the Burnet construal on the grounds that, although linguistically difficult, it is philosophically preferable.¹⁶ In the Anglophone world, the arguments of Burnet and Vlastos are at last beginning to tell.

The only reasoned opposition is that of De Strycker and Slings:

[Burnet’s] construction ... cannot be accepted. The parallelism of the two pointedly antithetical members requires (1) that the sentence could be ended with χρήματα, and that καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κτλ. should be considered an afterthought; (2) that γίγνεται should in both members mean ‘comes from’. Besides, the collocation of ἅπαντα shows that ἀγαθὰ cannot be separated from τὰ ἄλλα and ἅπαντα. If Plato had wanted to say what Burnet makes him say, he would certainly not have said it in such an ambiguous and misleading way.¹⁷

SOCRATES, PLATO, AND ARISTOTLE ON THE VALUE OF MONEY

Let me start from the third point, Burnet’s separation of ἀγαθὰ from καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Anyone who refuses to allow this has to meet a philosophical (not of course a philological) objection. If χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ is a unitary phrase, it implies that Socrates thinks money a good. But where else does Socrates, speaking *in propria persona* as he does throughout the *Apology*, call money or wealth a good?

¹⁰ *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs* (Stuttgart 1959) 109 with n.113.

¹¹ F.M. Cornford, *Before and After Socrates* (Cambridge 1932) 36; he does not cite Burnet, because he is writing for a non-scholarly audience.

¹² John Hammond Taylor, SJ, ‘Virtue and wealth according to Socrates (*Apol.* 30b)’, *Classical Bulletin* 49 (1973) 49–52.

¹³ Indianapolis 1989. See pp.124–5 with n.21.

¹⁴ Indianapolis 1997. This will be the standard complete works in English translation for a good while to come.

¹⁵ *The Trial and Death of Socrates* (Indianapolis 1980).

¹⁶ *Plato: Apology*, with introd., tr. and comm. (Warminster 1997), note *ad loc.* See also Stokes’s review of De Strycker and Slings, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 78 (1996) 192–8.

¹⁷ De Strycker and Slings (n.2) 334.

The only pertinent passages I know are ones where he is appealing to his interlocutor's values, not his own (e.g. *Prot.* 353c-354b, *Gorg.* 452c, 467e), or where he is preparing to correct the idea that money is good in itself (*Meno* 78e, *Euthyd.* 279a, *Lys.* 220a).¹⁸ At *Crito* 48c he disdains Crito's readiness to sacrifice money to help him escape from prison; justice is the only value that counts for him, money is simply irrelevant. Again, it is Crito's beliefs he is appealing to when at *Euthydemus* 307a he includes money-making among arts it is fine to have (Crito emphatically agrees that it seems so to him). Contrast *Republic* 2.357cd, where money-making is an example given by the aristocratic Glaucon to illustrate the burdensome type of good one pursues only for its consequences, not for itself: Socrates accepts the existence of that *kind* of good, but remains non-committal about the examples.

The *Apology* is a defence of philosophy. Socrates is a philosopher, not a money-maker like his friend Crito, nor an aristocrat like Glaucon. Only philosophical values are relevant to the syntax of our sentence. Given Burnet's construal, *Apology* 30b is in perfect harmony with the famous declaration we meet later at 41d:

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα.

For a good man no evil comes either in life or in death, nor are his affairs neglected by gods.

Everyone recognizes that Socrates is saying something profound and unusual here. It would be absurd to suppose he means that virtue guarantees a decent income, thereby warding off the evil of poverty. Burnet's construal of the earlier passage allows us to interpret him as saying that virtue will make not only money, but *lack* of money and *everything else* that happens in your life or after death, good rather than bad for you. Both in this life and the next, a virtuous person will make good use of even the most unfavourable circumstance. The two passages 30b and 41d stand to each other as positive and negative expressions of the same moral faith.

De Strycker and Slings agree that the two passages should be interpreted together – in their sense. To these they add other texts, notably *Laws* 1.631bc and this passage from *Republic* 10, which they describe as 'an authorized commentary' on *Apology* 41d:¹⁹

οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενίαι γίγνεται ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. (613a)

This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other *supposed* evil, for him these things will end in some good while he lives or even after death. For a man is never neglected by gods if he is willing to try hard to become just and, by the practice of virtue, to liken himself to god as far as is humanly possible.²⁰

On the face of it, Socrates is allowing here that virtue may well fail to ward off poverty. His language also seems incompatible with the standard translation of *Apology* 30b, because if poverty

¹⁸ Several of these texts are cited by Vlastos (n.5) 214-32 to argue that in Socrates' own view wealth is a 'non-moral good' whose value, however, is minuscule compared to the good of virtue. His argument, which has been influential (see nn.8 above and 25 below), ignores the dramatic contexts within which wealth is called good.

¹⁹ De Strycker and Slings (n.2) 234-5; I extend their quotation by one further sentence.

²⁰ On the nuances of the combination ἢ καὶ (which De Strycker and Slings render 'or else'), see J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (2nd edn, Oxford 1954) 306: 'Sometimes καὶ means "also", or marks a climax, "even".'

is only a supposed evil, then wealth is only a supposed good. Most people do suppose that poverty is bad, wealth good. But the Socrates of *Republic* 10 does not endorse their view.

In order to show that these first impressions are correct, and that neither *Republic* 10 nor *Laws* 631bc supports the De Strycker-Slings interpretation of *Apology* 30b, I need to track down the mistakes in their reasoning. Admittedly, some scholars are likely to find this superfluous. They would insist that the *Apology* represents the views of Socrates (or: Plato in his early, Socratic period), the *Republic* and *Laws* those of Plato (or: Plato in his middle and late periods), and it is not safe to interpret the *Apology* from the very different dialogues of Plato's maturity. I shall not take that easy way out. On the subject of money, I believe that Plato, who had lots, and Socrates, who did not, are at one. Leaving the *Laws* aside for the moment, let us turn to *Republic* 2.

Glaucon has challenged Socrates to show that justice is worth pursuing for its own sake, as an intrinsic good. He insists on postulating a just man with a reputation for injustice and an unjust man with a reputation for justice. Which will fare best? Only if the just man fares better, under this radical hypothesis about their respective reputations, will Glaucon be satisfied that justice is to be pursued entirely for its own sake, independently of reputation and its consequences (360e-362c). Adeimantus agrees. He complains that parents, teachers and poets do not recommend the young to practise justice for its own sake, but only for the consequences of a reputation for it (363a). And here he reiterates the consequences of a reputation for justice enumerated by Glaucon earlier at 362bc: people will want you to hold high office in the state and you will be able to marry yourself or your children into any family you wish (362e-363a). In short, a reputation for justice, however unmerited, inspires trust. The question is, how will the postulated unjust man use this trust?

Glaucon supposes that he will abuse it for all he can get, and what he will get is, above all, wealth. Through that will come favours for his friends and damage to his enemies, plus the goodwill of the gods, who will be delighted with his rich offerings and dedications (362bc). The crucial point here that the unjust man's wealth derives, not from his reputation for justice, but from the grasping injustice it conceals: *πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν* (362b 7; cf. 343de, 349c, 366a). If you miss this detail, you will be liable to misconstrue the argument of *Republic* 10. I fear that De Strycker and Slings do misconstrue it.

By the end of Book 9 Socrates has finished showing that, despite the unpleasant consequences of his reputation for injustice, the just man has the happier life. In Book 10, therefore, he feels entitled to drop the requirement that the just man have a reputation for injustice. In fact, he claims, justice *usually* (613c 4: τὸ πολὺ) and *in the long run* (613c 5: πρὸς τὸ τέλος) earns you the esteem of others and, in consequence, it brings the rewards that Glaucon at 2.362ac assigned to the unjust man with a reputation for justice: namely, the goodwill of the gods and, from fellow humans, any offices of state you may wish to hold and the opportunity to marry into any family you like (612e-613d). The consequences of a reputation for justice are exactly the same in Book 10 as they were in Book 2. Accordingly, they do not include wealth, which in Book 2 was the result of the injustice that the unjust man is so good at concealing. On the contrary, the context of the sentence quoted from 613a makes it clear that a just man, unlike the unjust man at 362c (and Cephalus at 1.331b), does not need wealth to win the goodwill of the gods. They respond to his godlike character, not to the offerings that money can buy. De Strycker and Slings are therefore mistaken when they include money among the rewards that usually come from justice in the long run.²¹ All the more are they mistaken when they quote 613a, without attending to the qualification 'supposed', as a promise that the gods will ensure compensation in the after-life for poverty in this.²²

²¹ De Strycker and Slings (n.2) 139.

²² De Strycker and Slings (n.2) 235. For the qualification 'supposed', cf. also 3.406c 7: τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων *δοκούντων εἶναι*.

Look again at the quote from *Republic* 10. It does not say that after death the gods will provide some *other* good to compensate for the awfulness experienced here and now. On the contrary, it is these very things (τὰὐτὰ) – poverty, disease and the like – that will end in some good for those who are virtuous. Virtue will have *made* something good of their trials and tribulations. In that sense, they were all along being cared for by gods. This is a providential universe in which virtue is sufficient for happiness.

Republic 10 should not be read in isolation. It is the sequel to a lengthy analysis in Books 8 and 9 of the forms that injustice takes in city and soul. The degeneration of the ideal city starts with the urge, on the part of one group of rulers, to make money and accumulate private wealth (8.547b). Money again is what motivates the next revolution, the forcible imposition of a property-based oligarchy (550c-551b). In due course, the oligarchs' greed for money is the cause of the democratic revolution by which they are overthrown (555bc). The parallel analysis of worse and worse individual personalities is all about the increasing dominance of the lowest part of the tripartite soul: the appetitive (4.439d: ἐπιθυμητικόν), money-loving (9.580e: φιλοχρήματων) part, parallel to the money-making (4.434c, 441a: χρηματιστικόν) producer class in the ideal city. This is the part of the soul which already in Book 4 was described as the largest in our make-up, and the one that by its nature is the most insatiable in pursuing money (442a); money is the means to the satisfaction of bodily desires (9.580e-581a). The self-inflicted damage that comes to a soul bent on wealth is further emphasized at 589d-590a and 591e. No one who reads Books 8-9 with care could come away believing that for Plato money in itself is any kind of good.²³ Rather, those Books are an extended demonstration of the thesis of *Meno* 87e-89a and *Euthydemus* 280b-281e that the possession of money is a disaster for all who are not virtuous. They prepare us for the *Republic's* last word on riches: when you go to Hades to choose your next life, beware of 'evils like wealth' (10.619a).

Now for the *Laws*. In the passage cited (1.631bc) the Athenian Stranger distinguishes two classes of goods: 'divine' goods like wisdom and the virtues, 'human' goods like health, beauty and strength. He claims that the divine goods bring with them also the three human goods – plus a fourth, wealth. But to this last he attaches a qualification, which De Strycker and Slings omit to mention: wealth is a good only if it is not blind, but guided by wisdom. That is exactly what Socrates says about wealth at *Apology* 30b, on Burnet's construal (given that for Socrates virtue is knowledge or wisdom), and in the *Meno* and *Euthydemus* passages cited above. It is also what Socrates conspicuously *fails* to say on the standard translation of *Apology* 30b. Again, at *Laws* 3.697bc (echoing 2.660e-661e), where three types of good are ranked in order of priority, third place is given to the *so-called* (λεγόμενα) goods of wealth and money. The qualification 'so-called' is implied again at 9.870ab, where the Athenian rejects the terms in which wealth is standardly praised among Greeks and barbarians. He insists that wealth is good only as a means to goodness of body and of soul, hence that those who would be happy must conduct their money-making with justice and temperance. *Laws* 5.742e-743c goes so far as to argue that the very rich *cannot* be good and therefore cannot be happy; it is not merely difficult, but impossible, for them to enter into Plato's version of the Kingdom of Heaven.

De Strycker and Slings concede that the *Meno* and *Euthydemus* favour Burnet.²⁴ Let me in turn concede to them that some money might accrue to the just man of *Republic* 613cd when he holds office in the state or contracts an advantageous marriage for himself or one of his children. The *Republic* teaches that the just man and he alone will know how to use that extra money for the good of his soul. An important passage of Book 9 (not featured in the discussion of De Strycker and Slings) tells us that a person of understanding (ὁ γέ νοῦν ἔχων) will be guided in

²³ Elsewhere, Plato locates the origin of war in the desire for money and possessions: *Rep.* 2.373d-374a, *Phd.* 66cd.

²⁴ P.138 n.39.

their acquisition or disposal of wealth by concern for the constitution (πολιτεία) of their soul, lest it be disturbed by having too much or too little (591ce; cf. 4.443e and 10.618be). This is entirely in keeping with Socrates' message at *Apology* 30ab. Virtue guides you to use whatever money you have for the good of your soul; which might mean giving it away to some needy friend. Whereas the standard translation, precisely because it takes χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ as a unitary phrase, implies that money is a good in its own right, even if, as De Strycker and Slings maintain, it is a minor good compared to virtue.²⁵ And this, I have argued, runs counter to everything Plato tells us elsewhere about Socrates' attitude to money.

The Platonic texts we have been studying stand at the beginning of a long debate. Some in the later Platonist tradition credit Plato with a standardized triple division of goods into goods of the soul (the virtues), goods of the body (health, beauty), and external goods, amongst which wealth is often included. Thus they agree with De Strycker and Slings in ascribing to Plato the view that external goods such as wealth are genuine goods. These, however, were Platonists who wanted to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Others such as Atticus, who preferred their Platonism pure, resisted, holding that for Plato the only goods are those of the soul.²⁶ And Aristotle's own position is more nuanced than appears from the later debate.

Rhetoric 1.5.1360a 4–28, b 12–25, does count money an external good, and as such a component of happiness, but Aristotle there is rehearsing reputable premises (ἔνδοξα) for orators to use in court or assembly; he does not commit himself to their truth. His own considered view emerges at *Eudemian Ethics* 7.15(8.3).1248b 26–34 (cf. 1249b 12–13): wealth and other supposed (δοκοῦντα) goods are indeed by nature goods, but for some (*sc.* the foolish or intemperate) they are bad – they are good only for those who are themselves good. At *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8.1099a 31–b 8, wealth is mentioned among the external goods necessary for happiness, but it is necessary for a particular reason. Aristotle explains that without external goods such as friends, wealth and political power you cannot do certain things your virtues would otherwise lead you to do; the virtues cannot be exercised as widely and grandly as one would wish (cf. 7.13.1153b 17–19).²⁷ The upshot is that wealth has instrumental value, but only for the virtuous – much as Socrates (on Burnet's construal) maintained! What we find in Aristotle's two *Ethics* is not outright dissent from Plato's view, but a sophisticated development of it.

It remains to consider a passage which De Strycker and Slings might have cited as evidence that Aristotle read *Apology* 30b their way:²⁸

κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις. (*Politics* 7.1.1323a 40–1)

People do not acquire and preserve the virtues by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of the virtues.

Aristotle tells us (1323a 21–3) that he is here making use of one of his published works,²⁹ written for a wider audience than the treatises, and that his treatment of the issues is somewhat superficial

²⁵ De Strycker and Slings' position on what they call 'minor goods' is close to that of Vlastos (n.5) ch.8 on 'mini-goods'; my objection is indicated at n.18 above.

²⁶ See Jaap Mansfeld, 'Notes on the *Didaskalicus*', with a mass of references to the relevant texts, in Mark Joyal (ed.), *Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition: Essays Presented to John Whittaker* (Aldershot 1997) at 248–54.

²⁷ Here I expand a tiny bit, guided by John Cooper, 'Aristotle on the goods of fortune', *Philosophical Review* 94 (1985) 173–96, repr. in his *Reason and Emotion:*

Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton 1999) ch.13.

²⁸ They do cite the passage (p.140 n.44), but as a parallel for their understanding of the *Apology*. It was W.L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* 3 (Oxford 1902) ad 1323a 36 and 40, who suggested that Aristotle is actually drawing on *Apol.* 30b.

²⁹ Quite possibly the *Protrepticus*: Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* (Göteborg 1961) 254–6.

(1323b 36-40). That diminishes the authority of this text as a source for Aristotelian doctrine. But it does not rule out the possibility that he is echoing Plato's *Apology*.

The external goods referred to are 'wealth, money, power, reputation, and all such things' (1323a 37-8). Does Aristotle mean to say here, what neither *Ethics* maintains, that *all* of these result from virtue – wealth and money included? His conclusion at the end of the chapter will be in line with the *Ethics*, that the best life is a life of virtue equipped with external goods *sufficient for exercising the virtues* (1323b 40-1324a 2). If the quoted sentence sounds less qualified, that may be because it draws on a popular work where Aristotle works with a broader brush than in the treatises. Moreover, it is embedded in an argument *ad hominem* against people who suppose that, while happiness requires all three types of good, the ideal is to accumulate external goods without limit (1323a 38: εἰς ἄπειρον) with enough virtue to get by.³⁰ To which Aristotle replies that in practice this will lose you the virtues and other goods of the soul, whereas if you go all out for the latter, they will bring you (enough of) the former. It is important here that Aristotle is debating with people who genuinely want (some) virtue as well as money, power and esteem. His point is that if they do not limit their pursuit of external goods, the virtues will fall by the way. Their ideal suffers from *practical* inconsistency, whereas someone who amasses goods of the soul will not thereby be prevented from acquiring (a moderate amount of) the external goods as well.

Nothing in this *ad hominem* argument commits Aristotle to more than Plato said in *Republic* 10, that in normal circumstances virtue is likely to win you a good reputation and political office. I see no reason to think that Aristotle has any Platonic text in view, but if he has, to my mind *Republic* 10 is at least as good a bet as *Apology* 30b. Aristotle at this point claims to be arguing from the facts of practical life (1323a 39-40: διὰ τῶν ἔργων), in contrast to some more theoretical arguments to follow (1323b 6-7: κατὰ τὸν λόγον). Plato did the same in *Republic* 10, after the theoretical arguments of Books 2-9: 'Isn't this how things are, if the truth must be told?' (613b 9-10: ἄρ' οὐχ ὡδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὄν τιθέναι;). Socrates at *Apology* 30b speaks in a quite different, exhortatory tone. Of course, if Aristotle meant to echo *Republic* 10, it was carelessness or a misunderstanding on his part to list wealth and money with the other external goods. But that is preferable to the supposition that he was remembering *Apology* 30b, taking *χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ* as a unitary phrase, and endorsing the result *in propria persona*. For we have seen that this is not his considered view. Not his view at all.

I have shown that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all agree that money is not a good in its own right, irrespective of the character of its possessor. As a matter of fact, Plato makes even Cephalus say that wealth is only good for decent types such as (he likes to think) himself (*Rep.* 1.331ab). This should be motive enough to go back to *Apology* 30b in search of a deeper rationale for Burnet's construal.

BEING AND BECOMING

First, let me repeat that the objection to the standard translation is philosophical, not philological. Partial parallels for the standard construal are easy to find:

ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας ... οἴονται γίνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (*Prot.* 323d 6-7)
 ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίαι κακὰ γίνονται, ὅταν γίνηται (*Rep.* 2.373e 6-7),

where *ἀγαθὰ* and *κακὰ* are plainly subject to the verb *γίνεσθαι*, not predicate. But any construal which assigns *ἀγαθὰ* to the subject-expression at *Apology* 30b 2-4 falls to the philosophical

³⁰ Here I am indebted to correspondence with John Cooper.

objection that Socrates does not normally consider money a good. Hence Burnet's alternative suggestion that the subject here is χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἅπαντα, with ἀγαθὰ separated off as predicate; ἐκ remains causal, as in the two passages just cited.³¹ My task is to offer a philological explanation of how ἀγαθὰ can be predicate.

Both the standard translation and Burnet's alternative need to supply the verb γίγνεται again after the comma. The difference is that the Burnet-Cornford-Vlastos-Cooper-Stokes translation brings it back with a complement it did not have before, separating ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις from τὰ ἄλλα. Point (2) of the De Strycker-Slings rebuttal is that this involves an objectionable change in the meaning of the verb γίγνεται. They assume, that is, that the change of *syntax* postulated by Burnet (from γίγνεται without, to γίγνεται with, a complement) entails a change in the *meaning* of the verb. First γίγνεται means 'comes to be', then 'becomes <good>'. The first meaning is existential, the second predicative. It is this assumption I wish to challenge. Burnet's few defenders to date have acknowledged that a change in the meaning of γίγνεσθαι is a difficulty for his construal.³² I hope to show there is no change of meaning and, consequently, no such difficulty. My argument will involve a lengthy digression, away from the *Apology*, into some of the deeper reaches of Platonic and Aristotelian ontology.

The De Strycker-Slings understanding of γίγνεσθαι is parallel to a standard account of the semantically related verb εἶναι. It is often said that this too is ambiguous between an existential and a predicative meaning. Either 'x ἐστὶ' is a complete statement, to be translated 'x exists', or it is what logicians call an open sentence, 'x is ...', where the dots mark a place to be filled by some appropriate predicate: 'x is F'. But recent scholarship has shown that, where Plato is concerned, this view is quite inadequate. It cannot explain, indeed it makes nonsense of, the way Plato handles the Greek verb 'to be' in some of the most important passages of his philosophy.³³ I shall argue that the same holds for his use of γίγνεσθαι.

Let us start with the phenomena. εἶναι is used both with and without a complement. We find both (1a) 'x ἐστὶ', and (1b) 'x ἐστὶ F', where x is a subject and F some predicate. I leave ἐστὶ unaccented here and in similar invented sentence forms, because the standard rules for its accentuation purport to differentiate between existence and predication, thereby prejudging the question at issue. In quotations from Greek authors I will treat ἐστὶ (and Doric singular ἐντι) as enclitic like εἰσί, except when initial and after οὐ. No solution is ideal (why not οὐκ εἶσι?), but for this discussion it is best not to encumber what was originally a tonal system of accentuation with a semantic distinction between existence (or possibility) and the copula.³⁴

Similarly, γίγνεσθαι is used sometimes with, sometimes without a complement: (2a) 'x γίγνεται', (2b) 'x γίγνεται F'. Our task is to understand the relation of (2a) and (2b). Thanks to the recent work just mentioned, the better understood relation between (1a) and (1b) should be of help. My argument will be that neither verb is ambiguous. Both (1a) and (2a) are, uncontroversially, complete statements. The more controversial claim is that to pass from (1a) to (1b), or from (2a) to (2b), is not to change the meaning of the verb, but to add a complement to a verb

³¹ *LSJ* s.v. III 6.

³² Taylor (n.12) 51; Stokes (n.16) 150.

³³ From a voluminous literature, I pick out for their excellence two writers in particular. First, Charles H. Kahn, 'Why existence does not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek philosophy', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1976) 323-34, and 'Some philosophical uses of "to be" in Plato', *Phronesis* 26 (1981) 105-34, which distills much of his previous work on the subject (listed at his n.45) going back to his massive study *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek (Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series 16 (1973), repr. Minneapolis*

2003). And more recently, Lesley Brown, 'The verb "to be" in Greek philosophy: some remarks', in Stephen Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought 3: Language* (Cambridge 1994) 212-36, which generalizes the lessons of her pioneering 'Being in the *Sophist*: a syntactical enquiry', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1986) 49-70. The idea of extending their approach from εἶναι to γίγνεσθαι is my own initiative.

³⁴ For critical remarks about standard editorial practice, see W.S. Barrett, *Euripides: Hippolytus*, ed. with introd. and comm. (Oxford 1964) 424-7, and Kahn (n.33: 1973) Appendix A, 420-5.

that was already complete, but further *completable*. Thus the essential idea is that of a verb which is complete on its own, but which is further completable without change of meaning.

There are many such verbs. Suppose someone rings up and asks what you are doing. You reply, 'I am teaching'. That is a complete answer to the question. But a more complete answer would be 'I am teaching French'. That each of these is a complete statement is shown by the fact that, when you receive the call, the first might be true and the second false (really, you are teaching a subject of which the authorities do not approve). And the first could be known to be true by a person who has no idea what you are teaching. Only a complete statement can be evaluated as true or false. Thus the verb 'to teach' is complete on its own, yet further *completable* by adding a complement. And no one would say that when a complement is added, it changes the meaning of the verb 'to teach'.³⁵

My suggestion is not, of course, that εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι should be construed on the model of 'to teach' as verbs that can take an (accusative) object. I am simply giving a familiar example of a verb which is complete but further completable, in order to help readers understand the less familiar idea that εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι show an analogous pattern. Without a complement they make a complete statement, but one that is further completable by adding a complement – without any change in the meaning of the verb.

To illustrate how this works out Platonic Greek, I adduce two philosophically important passages where the role of εἶναι is crucial.³⁶

BEING IN PLATO

At *Theaetetus* 185a 8-185d 1 we find the following stretch of argument, which I translate as best I can word-for-word, using a dash to indicate those places where εἶναι is understood but not expressed in the Greek:³⁷

SOCRATES. About a colour and a sound you surely do think about both of them, first, just this: that they both are (ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἔστόν)?

THEAETETUS. Yes, I do.

SOC. Consequently also that each — other than the other, and each — the same as itself?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. And that both — two, each — one?

THEAET. Yes, that too.

SOC. Consequently also you are able to consider whether they — like or unlike each other?

THEAET. Presumably.

SOC. Now through what do you think all these things about them? For you can't grasp what is common about them either through hearing or through sight. Again, this too is evidence for what we are saying: if it was possible to enquire whether both are salty or not (ἄρ' ἔστόν ἀλμυρῶ ἢ οὐ), you

³⁵ The example is gratefully borrowed from Brown's first article (n.33: 1986), but my use of it is more limited than hers. Her thesis that 'to teach' is 'a verb of variable polyadicity', in that it can be added to indefinitely ('I am teaching French to small children', 'with enthusiasm', etc., etc.), implies commitments in semantic theory which I do not wish to incur, let alone extend to εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι in ancient Greek.

³⁶ For obvious reasons, Plato's language is the main focus of this study. Kahn (n.33: 1973) gives a broader treatment of εἶναι in Homer and authors of the Classical period, which establishes beyond doubt that Plato's use of the verb is typical, however novel the philosophical theory he builds on it. We shall see that the same is true

of Aristotle and the other philosophical authors considered below.

³⁷ In Russian (the language for which this essay on cross-cultural translation was originally written), as in some other Indo-European languages, the present indicative of the verb 'to be' is 'unmarked'. Between two nouns it may be indicated by a dash; in conversation, one simply goes straight from subject to predicate without a word between, just like Plato's Greek in the passage quoted. Note that omission is not restricted to (and so is no criterion for) non-existential uses of εἶναι: Kahn (n.33: 1973) 264 n.32, where an example like Hom. *Od.* 13.102-3 could go over into Russian word-for-word.

know you can say by what you would examine them, and this is clearly neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

THEAET. Yes, of course: the power which functions through the tongue.

SOC. Well said. Now, through what does that power function which reveals to you what is common both to everything and to these? I mean that which you express by the words ‘is’ and ‘is not’ (ὡς τὸ “ἔστιν” ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ “οὐκ ἔστι”), and the other things mentioned in our questions about them just now. To all these, what organs will you assign through which the perceiving element in us perceives them?

THEAET. You are speaking of being and not-being (οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι), and likeness and unlikeness, and the same and different; also one, and any other number connected with them.³⁸

Readers will have supplied the verb ‘to be’, without difficulty, each time a dash indicates that εἶναι is not expressed. But is the verb you supplied the same verb as you met at the very beginning of the passage, or a different one?

I imagine that many readers will say it is different. They will probably take the verb in ‘that they both are’ as existential (‘they both exist’), but the verb supplied in the sequel as the predicative copula. Notice, however, that in the summing up at the end Socrates’ ‘is’ and ‘is not’ (τὸ “ἔστιν” ... καὶ τὸ “οὐκ ἔστι”) and Theaetetus’ ‘being and not-being’ (οὐσίαν ... καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι) cover both. As if only one verb had preceded. As if for Plato the verb supplied is one and the same with the verb expressed at the beginning. And indeed the argument *requires* a single, unitary verb throughout.

Consider the negative οὐκ ἔστι, which like its positive counterpart expresses something ‘common both to everything and to these (*sc.* the colour and the sound we started from)’. If you take οὐκ ἔστι as negated existence, you make Socrates say that the colour, the sound, and everything else both exist and do not exist. Which is absurd. But it is not absurd to understand him to mean, e.g., that the colour *is* the same as itself and *is not* the same as the sound, or that the sound *is* like the colour (in that both are sensible qualities) and *is not* at all salty. As Plato will point out in the *Sophist* (256d-257a, 263b 11-12), of everything whatsoever it can be said both that it *is* various things and that it *is not* innumerable other things, where the ‘is’ expresses predication. Or to put the thesis in its most general and most striking terms, that which is *is not* and that which is not *is* (258d-259b).

Observe how Plato moves in this climactic passage from ‘x οὐκ ἔστι F’ to ‘x οὐκ ἔστι’. (A verb that is complete but further completable is also subject to the reverse process of dropping the further completion: ‘I am teaching French’ entails ‘I am teaching’.) It would clearly be wrong to render ‘x οὐκ ἔστι’ here by ‘x does not exist’. And Plato is not the only ancient writer to make such moves:

καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὰ γὰρ τῆιδ’ ἐόντα ἐν τῆι Λιβύῃ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν Λιβύῃ ἐν Κύπρῳ. καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. οὐκῶν καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί. (*Dissoi Logoi* (= DK 90) 5, 5)

And the same things both are and are not. For the things here are not in Libya, nor are those in Libya in Cyprus. And likewise with the rest, by the same argument. So things both are and are not.

Even if the anonymous author, as I suspect, is indebted to Plato,³⁹ at least he felt no linguistic or logical discomfort at using the same pattern of inference.

³⁸ I have discussed the philosophical significance of this argument in ‘Plato on the grammar of perceiving’, *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 29-51, and its place in an overall interpretation of the dialogue in *The Theaetetus of Plato* (Indianapolis 1990) 52-65.

³⁹ For scepticism about the standard dating of this tract to around 400 BC, see my entry ‘Dissoi Logoi’ in Edward Craig (ed.), *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London 1998) 106-7.

In sum, there is every reason to think that the ἐστὶ we supply when Socrates in our *Theaetetus* passage says ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, κτλ. is the same verb as the ἐστὸν we began with. First it stands on its own, then it joins subject to predicate. It is easy to supply when it joins subject to predicate, because that same verb has already been expressed in the immediately preceding context. Plato brings it back at 185b 10 (ἄρ' ἐστὸν ἀλμυρὸν ἢ οὐ) because Socrates began a new line of questioning at 185b 7. When εἶναι stands on its own, it is often appropriate to translate with our verb 'to exist', though I would advise against that here.⁴⁰ But the possibility of so translating should not deceive us into the idea that 'to exist' reproduces the exact meaning of the Greek verb.

Another philosophically important Platonic passage which requires a unitary understanding of εἶναι is the discussion of knowledge and opinion beginning at *Republic* 5.476d. To show the lovers of sights and sounds that they do not have the knowledge they think they have, Socrates takes them through an argument with four steps. They agree (i) that knowledge is always of what is (τὸ ὄν). Then they accept (ii) that each of the many beautiful things they adore will turn out to be ugly as well, hence *not* beautiful, in the same way as each of the many large things will turn out to be no more large than small, hence both large and *not* large; and so on through a series of predicates which apply in one context or comparison only to be replaced in another by their opposites, both contrary and contradictory. From (ii) Socrates infers (iii) that the things conventionally held to be beautiful, large, etc., 'roll around somewhere between what is not and what purely is' (479d 4-5: μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς), and so concludes (iv) that they cannot be objects of knowledge, precisely because, as agreed at (i), knowledge is always of what is.⁴¹ Here it certainly makes nonsense of the argument to render the participial phrase τὸ ὄν as 'what exists'. That would condemn the beautiful things which turn out ugly and not beautiful to hover, absurdly, between existence and non-existence.⁴² If (iii) is to be inferred from (ii), 'what purely is' must employ the same 'is' as occurs in predications of the form 'x is both beautiful and ugly', and 'what is not' the same 'is not' as occurs in 'x is both beautiful and not beautiful'. Plato moves happily from 'x is F' to 'x is' and from 'x is not F' to 'x is not'.

To this unitary verb (and its participial derivatives: τὸ ὄν, τὰ ὄντα, etc.) corresponds, according to Plato in the *Sophist*, a unitary Form: Being. The *Sophist* (252e-260b, 261d) compares Forms like Being and Not-being, Sameness and Difference, to the vowels which join consonants to each other. Every syllable needs a vowel, but that does not make the vowel a mere link (copula). It has a phonetic value of its own. Just so, the 'is' which in Platonic Greek joins subject to predicate has semantic meaning in its own right, such that it can also stand as sole predicate in a complete sentence.

⁴⁰ As a case where translation in terms of existence is entirely appropriate, Brown (n.33: 1986) 63-4 aptly cites the *Sophist's* review of theories about what there is, beginning at 242c.

⁴¹ This is but a brief summary of the points relevant to my discussion. For a fuller treatment of the way τὸ ὄν in (i) unpacks into the explicitly predicative εἶναι of (ii), see Kahn (n.33: 1981) 112-14.

⁴² Just this absurdity is found in the very first English translation of the *Republic* (Spens 1763: 'between existence and non-existence'), and occasionally in its modern successors (e.g. Lee 1955). Some English translators prefer 'between unreality and perfect reality', *vel sim.*, because degrees of reality make better sense than degrees

of existence (Cornford 1941, Sterling and Scott 1985, Halliwell 1993, Waterfield 1993). Those who offer 'between nonbeing and pure being', *vel sim.* (Jowett 1875, Bloom 1968, Grube 1974), do so in a context where 'being' need not be understood as 'existence', because they have used the indeterminate 'what is' and 'what is not' since 476e 10. But the two best translations to date (Shorey 1930-35, Lindsay 1935) stick close to the Greek: 'between that which is not and that which purely is', *vel sim.* (likewise Reeve's 1992 revision of Grube). This does justice to the fact that που at 479d 4 picks up the earlier locative designation of τὸ ὄν as the domain or province (the ἐφ' ᾧ) of knowledge, and of τὸ ὄν as the domain or province of ignorance (477a 9-10).

A nice illustration for the complete but completable character of Platonic εἶναι is *Laws* 10.901c 8-d 2, where within a single sentence the verb is first complete and then further completed:

νῦν δὴ δὺ' ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφοτέροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἄτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελείς τῶν σμικρῶν.

Now let the three of us receive an answer from the two parties who agree that gods are – <but are> venal in the view of one, negligent of small details according to the other.⁴³

BEING IN ARISTOTLE

Much the same story can be told of Aristotelian Greek, even though Aristotle is famous for insisting, against Plato's unitary concept of being, that τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς: what *is* is said (*sc.* to be) in many ways. Each of the ten categories (κατηγορίαί, types of predication) imports an irreducibly different genus of being. But none of them are existence in contrast to predication. Being is being a substance, or a quantity, or a quality, etc. As Aristotle explains in *Metaphysics* 7.1 (cf. *Metaph.* 4.2), each of these is a being (ὄν), but only a substance is a being *simpliciter* (1028a 30-1: οὐ τὶ ὄν ἄλλ' ὄν ἀπλῶς), because a quantity or quality, etc., is always the quantity, quality, etc., of some substance. The substance is what it is – it is a dog, a substance, a being – in its own right. The others are beings (ὄντα, things that are) only because they quantify, qualify, etc., some substance. Yet they are beings, albeit dependent ones. So none of this entitles us to equate being ἀπλῶς with existence. That would confine existence to the category of substance, with the result that Aristotle's deliberately generous ontology would be wrecked. Being ἀπλῶς is being a substance. But another way of being is being a quality (of some substance). All of the things that are (as we would say, all of the things that exist) are by being (predicatively) something or other: 'x ἐστὶ' implies 'x ἐστὶ F', for some categorially suitable value of F.

Aristotle is more cautious than Plato about the converse implication, from 'x ἐστὶ F' to 'x ἐστὶ'. He acknowledges certain exceptions to the rule that anything which is (predicatively) something or other *is*. For example, 'Homer is a poet' does not imply 'Homer is' (because he is now dead), 'What is not is thought about (δοξαστόν)' does not imply 'What is not is' (*Int.* 11.21a 25-33, *Soph. el.* 5.167a 1-2; 25; cf. 25.180a 36-8, *Metaph.* 9.3.1047a 32-5). But these are exceptions to the general rule that you *can* infer from 'x is F' to 'x is'; you can unless a particular value of F (e.g. being thought about) makes it unsafe to do so.⁴⁴ For Aristotle, as for Plato, the 'is' that joins subject to predicate has semantic meaning in its own right. The important difference between the two philosophers is that where Plato recognizes just one such 'is', Aristotle insists on ten. Consequently, for Aristotle the meaning that 'is' has varies with the category of the predicate it joins to a subject.

⁴³ This choice example (later echoed in both content and syntax by Epictetus, *Diss.* I 12.1) arrived in a letter from Lesley Brown. Earlier in the same discussion, the Athenian undertook to defend the thesis ὡς θεοὶ τε εἰσὶν καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων (887b 7-8).

⁴⁴ Such exceptions are well discussed by Brown (n.33: 1994) 233-6. The first systematic challenge to the general rule came from the Stoics, who distinguish the class of beings (ὄντα), provocatively restricted to bodies, from the most general class of 'somethings' (τινά), which

additionally includes certain incorporeal items like void, place, time and λεκτά ('sayables'). In effect, the Stoics allow 'x ἐστὶ F' to range more widely than 'x ἐστὶ', blocking the inference from the first to the second. For a valuable discussion of this doctrine and its anti-Platonic import, see Jacques Brunschwig, 'The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology', in his *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1994) 92-157. The inference was defended (question-beggingly) by later Aristotelians (Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 301.19) as well as Platonists (Plot. VI 1 [42] 25, 9-10).

I conclude that Aristotle, like Plato, does not recognize the idea we express by speaking of the verb ‘to be’ as a mere copula, an empty link. The nearest he gets to it is the difficult and debated passage *De Interpretatione* 3.16b 19-25,⁴⁵ from which I quote a single sentence:

αὐτὸ [sc. τὸ ὄν ψιλόν] μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν, προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν τινα, ἣν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι.

On its own it [sc. bare ‘being’] is nothing, but it additionally signifies a certain combination, which cannot be thought of without its components.

Aristotle is often supposed to say here that the ‘is’ in ‘Socrates is wise’ has no semantic meaning of its own, but is a mere copula. Yet it fits the context better to take this as a remark about someone uttering the solitary word ‘is’ all by itself, not about the word ‘is’ in a standard predication. It is not that in a standard predication the verb has no meaning in its own right, but that *what* its meaning is (what *sort* of being it signifies) is contextually dependent on the subject and/or predicate expressions flanking it; hence without a context it has no meaning at all, whereas an ordinary verb uttered on its own (someone suddenly shouts out ‘Sits’) does at least put the hearer in mind of its signification.⁴⁶ Besides, *προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν τινα* suggests that εἶναι *always* has a copulative function as part (but only part) of its meaning. That would rule out an independent existential meaning. (Once again, to be is to be something or other.) To isolate the copula, it seems, you need to be able to *contrast* it with the ‘is’ of existence (or, some would add, the ‘is’ of identity).⁴⁷

The importance of contrast becomes manifest when Galen, writing an elementary logic book for a much later age, lists ten different types of premise, one for each of the Aristotelian categories, but adds an extra. The categorial premises are statements about substance like ‘Air is a body’, ‘Air is not a body’, statements about quantity such as ‘The Sun is a foot across’, ‘The Sun is not a foot across’, statements about quality and so on (*Inst. Log.* 2, p.5.3-22 Kalbfleisch). But these are preceded, as never happens when Aristotle lists his categories, by this:

⟨τῶν δὲ προτάσεων⟩ ἔναι μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀπλῆς ὑπάρξεως ἀποφαινόνται, καθάπερ ὅποταν εἴπηις ‘πρόνοιά ἐστιν· ἵπποκένταυρος οὐκ ἔστιν’. (*Inst. Log.* 2, p.5.1-3)

Of premises, some make an assertion about simple existence, as when you say ‘Providence is’, ‘A hippocentaur is not’.

Thus Galen does isolate what I would call an existential *use* (as opposed to an existential meaning) of the verb ‘to be’, alongside but distinguished from predications in the category of substance like ‘Air is a body’.⁴⁸ By ‘existential use’ I mean nothing more than a use that we can translate by our verb ‘to exist’. To mark off this use Galen has the noun ὑπαρξις, a word first attested in this role by Philodemus⁴⁹ and increasingly current thereafter in philosophical discus-

⁴⁵ Hermann Wiedemann, *Aristoteles: Peri Hermeneias*, tr. and comm. (Berlin 1994) 178-87, provides an exhaustive account of the debate from antiquity into modern times.

⁴⁶ So C.W.A. Whitaker, *Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic* (Oxford 1996) 55-9 (cf. 30-2), arguing against J.L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, tr. with notes and comm. (Oxford 1963) *ad loc.*

⁴⁷ For reason to doubt that the differences between predicative and identity statements are due to different meanings of ‘is’ or ἐστι, see Benson Mates, ‘Identity and predication in Plato’, *Phronesis* 24 (1979) 216-20.

⁴⁸ Distinguished from it by ἦ at line 3, alongside it because ἔναι μὲν contrasts with ἔναι δέ at line 6, where quantity and other dependent categories come in.

⁴⁹ *De Dis.* 3, col.10, 35 Diels, *De Pietate* col.22, 628 Obbink, both about the existence of gods. ὑπαρξις = property comes earlier.

sions about the existence, as we would put it, of this or that controversial item. It was such controversies that he had especially in view when introducing his extra type of premise; he refers to disputes about the ὑπαρξίς or οὐσία of fate, providence, gods, and void (*Inst. Log.* 14, p.32.6-11).

Notice, however, that Galen writes ἀπλῆ ὑπαρξίς to make the contrast between 'Providence is' and a predication in the category of substance like 'Air is a body'.⁵⁰ The reason is that the root verb ὑπάρχειν can take a predicative complement just like εἶναι.⁵¹ (From Aristotle onwards, logicians canonically rewrite this in reverse form as 'A ὑπάρχει τῶι B', where A is predicate and B subject.) Like εἶναι, ὑπάρχειν is completable. This has implications for the noun ὑπαρξίς. It tends to represent uses of ὑπάρχειν which we translate existentially.⁵² Some dramatic examples occur in Philo Judaeus. When he insists that ἔστι τὸ θεῖον καὶ ὑπάρχει, and follows with a reference to God's ὑπαρξίς,⁵³ it is tempting to take the καί as exegetic. At any rate, he often declares that we can (and should) know *that* God exists, but we cannot (and should not aspire to) know *what* he is (his οὐσία, essence) or what he is like (his ποιότης). In saying this, Philo is helped by being able to gloss the verb εἶναι with the noun ὑπαρξίς, to make clear that he means being *simpliciter*, not being (predicatively) something or other. Thus 'The fact that He *is* can be apprehended under the name of existence' (τὸ δ'ὅτι ἔστιν ὑπαρξέως ὀνόματι καταληπτόν).⁵⁴ Or again, God says ἴδετε, ἴδετε, ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι (*Deuteronomy* 32:39), and Philo interprets: ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι ἴδετε, τουτέστι τὴν ἐμὴν ὑπαρξίν θεάσασθε.⁵⁵

Yet in principle a verbal noun might represent any use of its root verb. And in practice the form 'x ὑπάρχει F' allows the noun ὑπαρξίς to signify the obtaining of a whole state of affairs, x's actually being F, just as τὸ ὄν does in the *Republic* 10 passage (613b 9-10) cited above (p. 8).⁵⁶ ὑπαρξίς also serves as the noun (a) for the construction ὑπάρχειν τινί which

⁵⁰ A different use of the phrase occurs in Galen's near-contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Top.* 52.25-53.10, where ἀπλῆ ὑπαρξίς is belonging to something *simpliciter* as opposed to belonging as its genus; it contrasts with the different ways of being or belonging to a subject (τρόποι ὑπαρξέως) determined, not by the theory of categories, but by the *Topics* doctrine of predicables. In general, ἀπλοῦς and ἀπλῶς are devices for setting aside whatever qualifications are relevant in a given context.

⁵¹ Examples: Arist. *Meteor.* 2.8.365b 24, *Part. an.* 4.10.688a 21; Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 2.5, *Math.* 8.305, 9.182; Alex. Aphr. *In Apr.* 275.21; Plot. 14 [46] 3, 28-9, II 1 [40] 2, 27-8.

⁵² For the good reason that 'being there already' is what the verb expresses on its second extant occurrence (Pind. *Pyth.* 4.205) and frequently thereafter. In a valuable (and humorous) article, 'The origin of ὑπάρχω and ὑπαρξίς as philosophical terms', in F. Romano and D.P. Taormina (eds), *Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo* (Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo, Florence 1994) 1-23, John Glucker classifies the various uses of ὑπάρχειν in both philosophical and non-philosophical authors of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, and shows how they all relate in one way or another to the idea of being there already. He speaks more readily than I would of different 'senses' of the verb, overestimates the extent to which its range narrows later under Stoic influence, and wrongly assigns the first existential use of the noun ὑπαρξίς to Philo Judaeus. But these minor disagreements still leave me in debt to his helpful contribution.

⁵³ *Opif.* 170. Cf. *Opif.* 172; *Spec.* 1.41, 2.225; *Aet.* 53 and 70.

⁵⁴ *Praem.* 40, reading ὀνόματι with Colson and all MSS except A, against Cohn, who prints A's ὄνομα.

⁵⁵ *Post.* 168.

⁵⁶ Examples: Plut. *De E* 387c; Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.* 216.11-16 (where ὑπαρξίς contrasts with ἀναίρεσις, something's not being the case); Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 2.5, *Math.* 8.304. So too in Galen himself ὑπαρξίς (without ἀπλῆ) sometimes represents the use of ὑπάρχειν to signify the obtaining of a whole state of affairs: *Inst. Log.* 3, p.7.13; p.8.8-9; 4, p.9.21; 5, p.12.17. In the Stoic definition of a true proposition under attack at Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.85-6 (φασὶ γὰρ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἶναι ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντικεῖται τινι ὑπάρχειν *cannot* mean 'to exist' because there are false propositions as well as true. The truth of a Stoic ἀξίωμα (a non-linguistic item expressible by a sentence) is something's being the case, a whole state of affairs obtaining; Gal. *Inst. Log.* 15, p.35.12 and 17, or Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 1.14 may serve to illustrate ὑπάρχειν used in accordance with this definition. There is even a word ὑπαρκτικός, glossed by Ammonius, *In Int.* 27.12-13 as 'expressive of one thing's belonging or not belonging to another', which corresponds (for subject-predicate propositions) to the modern logician's 'having truth-value'. It is then no surprise to find that in modal logic ὑπάρχουσα πρότασις is an 'assertoric' premise of the form 'x belongs to y' (with ὑπαρχόντως, not in *LSJ*, the associated adverb), as opposed to an 'apodeictic' one of the form 'x necessarily belongs to y': e.g. Alex. Aphr. *In Apr.* 124.21-8.

expresses a predicate's belonging to a subject,⁵⁷ (b) for the generic being *of* something,⁵⁸ and (c) for the specific οὐσία of any item in any category.⁵⁹ Eventually it becomes a noun of divided reference, so that Simplicius, for example, can treat all ὄντα as ὑπάρξεις.⁶⁰ Evidently, the import of ὑπάρξεις varies with, and depends upon, its larger context. It nominalizes whichever use of ὑπάρχειν is in play. Certainly, it has a use, as οὐσία does, which corresponds to our 'existence' and is most naturally translated that way. But if this use is a function of context, it should not be represented as a prior lexical meaning brought *to* the context. One should be cautious about saying, as many scholars have done, that ὑπάρξεις *means* existence.⁶¹ One should be equally hesitant to claim that Galen's extra type of premise establishes an existential meaning for εἶναι. Rather, he has singled out a use to which the verb can be put in a given context. Which is not enough to yield an 'is' meaning 'exists' to contrast with the bare copula.

Compare ὑπάρξεις in the sense of 'property'. That is a genuinely distinct meaning, in need of its own dictionary entry, which ὑπάρξεις shares with οὐσία. At *Theaetetus* 144cd Plato introduces Theaetetus as a talented youth whose trustees have wasted the οὐσία (property) he inherited from his wealthy father. In the ensuing discussion Socrates' midwifery will help him give birth to a theory of knowledge which does away with οὐσία (being) and leaves only becoming: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται (152d).⁶² Such word play is typical of Plato. A pun is clear evidence of distinct meanings. It is hard to imagine a comparable pun on the predicative and existential uses of either οὐσία or ὑπάρξεις.

At this point we should return to Aristotle. When at *Posterior Analytics* 2.1.89b 31-5 he points to a certain priority attaching to the question whether e.g. a centaur or a god is or is not ἀπλῶς (as opposed to: is white or not), he immediately adds that once we know *that* the thing is, we inquire 'What, then, is a god?' (τί οὖν ἐστὶ θεός). One cannot in English ask *'What, then, exists a god?' Aristotle treats a statement of the form 'x is', which we would naturally (and for many purposes not wrongly) render 'x exists', as prelude to the question 'What is x?' (hence the οὖν). For him, to be *is* to be something or other (in one of the ten categories), so if a centaur or a god is, *what* (predicatively) is it? He regards the 'is' of 'is *simpliciter*' as complete but further completable – by a predicate in the category of substance.⁶³ I have little doubt that this Aristotelian text, together with *De Interpretatione* 10.19b 12-15 (discussed below), is Galen's cue for adding his extra premise. Aristotle's pupil Eudemus of Rhodes had already spoken of Σωκράτης ἐστί and Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔστι as 'simple premises' (ἀπλάϊ προτάσεις).⁶⁴ He is likely to be systematizing, not dissenting from, his master. The same holds for Galen. In which case the ἐστί of his extra premise will be as completable as the ὑπάρχειν of his ἀπλή ὑπάρξεις.

⁵⁷ A very clear example is Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 375.16-17, 23-4.

⁵⁸ Porph. *ap. Simpl. In Cat.* 34.21-3; Ammon. *In Cat.* 20.26-21.1.

⁵⁹ Alex. Aphr. *In Metaph.* 399.14-16: ἡ γὰρ ἐκάστου οἰκεία ὑπάρξεις οὐσία ἐκείνου.

⁶⁰ *In Cat.* 67.27-36, where it is handy to have a term which is neutral between the various Aristotelian categories in a way that ὄντα cannot officially be.

⁶¹ On the importance of distinguishing the 'input question' (what meaning a word brings to its sentential context) from the 'output question' (what meaning it has in that context), see David Wiggins, 'On sentence-sense, word-sense and difference of word-sense. Towards a philosophical theory of dictionaries', in Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds), *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology* (Cambridge 1971) 14-34.

⁶² From a paragraph which is itself a vivid illustration of the impossibility of distinguishing an existential as opposed to copulative meaning for either verb.

⁶³ Here again I follow Brown (n.33: 1994). Compare Kahn (n.33: 1976) 333: 'Thus for Aristotle, as for Plato, existence is always εἶναι τι, being something or other, being something definite. There is no concept of existence as such, for subjects of an indeterminate nature ... Platonic Greek for "X exists" is "X is something", εἶναι τι.' For examples of this use of εἶναι τι, see *Phd.* 74a 9-12, 102b 1, *Rep.* 9.583c 5, 584d 3, *Thi.* 157a 3 and 5, *Soph.* 246e 5, 247a 9, *Tim.* 51b 7-8, *Phlb.* 37a 2-9. The idiom is less frequent in Aristotle, because of his technical contrast between εἶναι τι and εἶναι ἀπλῶς, but examples abound in his discussion of place at *Phys.* 5.1-5 (210a12, etc.).

⁶⁴ *Fr.* 27 Wehrli = Schol. In *Ar. APr.* I cod. 1917 in margine p.146a 24-7 Brandis.

About the other side of the missing contrast I can venture further. Were Aristotle to start thinking in terms of a copula without semantic meaning of its own, he would lose not only the theory of categories, but also other philosophical theses centred on that all-important verb εἶναι. There would be little or no content to the distinction between a thing's essential and its accidental *being* (*Metaph.* 5.7), which would reduce to the distinction between its essential and accidental *predicates*. There would be little or no sense to the idea that potential being is as much a type of being as actual being (*Metaph.* 5.7; 6.2.1026a 33-b 2; 9.1.1045a 32-4). Worst of all, there would be no subject-matter for first philosophy, which is the study of *being qua being* (*Metaph.* 4.1-2, 6.1).

BECOMING IN ARISTOTLE

Now for a parallel account of γίγνεσθαι. The close relation between εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι is recognized by Aristotle at *De Interpretatione* 10.19b 12-15, where he groups γίγνεται with ἔστιν, ἔσται, ἦν and the like. All these count as verbs by the definition of ῥῆμα laid down in *Int.* 3, because they additionally signify time. Hence, when combined with a subject, they suffice, without further complement, to make an assertion, e.g. ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος or (I add) γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος. Aristotle goes on to consider the case where ἔστιν – or (I add) γίγνεται – is ‘predicated additionally as a third thing’ (τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσκατηγορηθῆι).⁶⁵ His example is the predicative assertion ‘A human is just’ (19b 19-22: ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος) – to which I add ‘A human becomes just’ (γίγνεται δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος). But he says nothing to show that in his eyes this is a different ἔστι/γίγνεται, or a different meaning, from before.⁶⁶

In other contexts, however, Aristotle distinguishes γίγνεσθαι ἀπλῶς from γίγνεσθαί τι, where ἀπλῶς indicates a use of the verb without complement and τι its use with a complement from one of the three non-substantial categories (quality, quantity and place) in which he holds change can happen. (Recall the parallel treatment of εἶναι in the phrase quoted from *Metaph.* 7.1.1028a 30-1: οὐ τί ὄν ἀλλ’ ὄν ἀπλῶς.) It is not that ordinary speakers are likely to say ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται ἀπλῶς. They say ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται and Aristotle uses ἀπλῶς to mark the difference between that use of the verb and its use when someone says ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται δίκαιος or τρίπηχυς or ἐν Λυκείῳ.⁶⁷

Aristotle's most extended discussion of the contrast between γίγνεσθαι ἀπλῶς and γίγνεσθαί τι is *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1.2-5.⁶⁸ The task he sets himself is twofold. First, he will vindicate the coherence of the idea that things come to be *simpliciter*. Then he will defend the distinction between (a) coming to be *simpliciter* (substantial change) and (b) change of quality (ἀλλοίωσις) or quantity (αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις). In (a) a subject comes to be from another subject which perishes in the process, as when the water in your kettle disappears into steam or air. In (b) a single subject remains while new properties replace the old. Note the symmetry.⁶⁹ In (b) a subject remains while one property is exchanged for another. In (a) a property remains (according to Aristotle, both water and air are wet) while one subject is exchanged for another.

⁶⁵ Cf. *APr.* 1.1.24b 16-18; 3.25b 22.

⁶⁶ Wiedemann's lengthy review of rival interpretations of the passage (n.45, 327-38) nowhere pauses to defend the assumption (written into his translation) that Aristotle switches from ἔστι as ‘Existenzprädikat’ to ἔστι as ‘Kopula’; nor does he record anyone else doing so. About γίγνεται both he and Ackrill (n.46) remain silent.

⁶⁷ This last is the use that Aristotle invokes for a list of the three types of non-substantial change at *Cael.* 1.7.274b 15-16 (εἰ αδύνατον γενέσθαι λευκὸν ἢ πεχυαῖον ἢ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ), so please do not think that

γίγνεσθαι ἐν Λυκείῳ would have to mean ‘be born in the Lyceum’. At *Hdt.* 5.33 Megabates set sail and in due course ἐγένετο ἐν Χίῳ. Against the idea that ‘to be born’ is the root meaning of γίγνεσθαι, see Kahn (n.33: 1973) 384-5.

⁶⁸ At 317a 33 Aristotle uses κυρίως as a synonym for ἀπλῶς; at 317a 17 he speaks of ἡ ἀπλή καὶ τελεία γένεσις. Briefer treatments of the contrast can be found at *Phys.* 5.1.225a 12-17, *Metaph.* 8.1.1042a 32-b 8.

⁶⁹ Here I am indebted to Sarah Broadie.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Aristotle's arguments, which are among the most difficult in the corpus. Rather, I am interested in the way some commentators react to them philosophically. Take C.J.F. Williams, who explains very clearly in his Introduction why Aristotle's distinction between γίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς and γίνεσθαί does not match our distinction between coming into existence and coming to be something or other.⁷⁰ Aristotle treats the contrast between (2a) 'x γίγνεται' and (2b) 'x γίγνεται F' as a case of categorial ambiguity. He associates (2a) with a predication in the category of substance (the γένεσις results in the truth of e.g. 'Socrates is a human', 'Cerberus is a dog'), (2b) with a predication in one of the non-substantial categories (the γένεσις results in the truth of e.g. 'Socrates is wise', 'Cerberus is sleepy'). Thus Williams reads (2a), as I do, in terms of a predicative rather than an existential meaning of εἶναι. But then he argues that Aristotle did not have the philosophical resources to analyse (2a) adequately. No one did until Frege in the 19th century had the insight that 'exists' is a second-order, not a first-order predicate; it is a predicate of concepts, not of objects, and what e.g. 'Tame tigers exist' says is that the concept 'tame tiger' has at least one instance, can be truly predicated of at least one object which is both a tiger and tame.⁷¹ Not having the modern logical analysis of the verb 'to exist', Aristotle inevitably failed to make adequate sense of (2a). He lacked insight into his own language.

I wish to argue, on the contrary, that it is Williams who lacks insight – not into his own language, English, but into the Greek that Aristotle spoke, read and wrote in the 4th century BC. In Aristotle's Greek (2a) makes a complete statement which, like (1a) 'x ἐστὶ' but *unlike* our modern 'x exists', can be further completed by adding a complement without any change in the meaning of the verb. You cannot pass from 'x exists' to *'x exists tame/ a tiger'. But the texts adduced earlier from Plato's *Theaetetus* and Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* show that in their Greek you can pass from 'x ἐστὶ' to 'x ἐστὶν ἡμερος/τίγρις'. Now for the parallel case of (2a) and (2b).

Consider this sentence at *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a 13-14: πάντα δὲ τὰ γινόμενα ὑπὸ τέ τινος γίγνεται καὶ ἕκ τινος καὶ τί. If you are surprised at the syntax, please note that variants with the same syntax are found elsewhere (*Metaph.* 7.8.1033a 24-8; 9.8.1049b 28-9; *Gen. an.* 2.1.733b 24-6; cf. also *Phys.* 1.7.190b 10-13). We are dealing with a formula dear to Aristotle's heart, not a piece of careless writing. The problem is how to render it into a modern language.

A word-for-word translation would be this:

Everything that comes to be comes to be (i) by the agency of something and (ii) from something and (iii) something.

But that feels ungrammatical in English. One would be uncomfortable reading it aloud to an audience, because we incline to understand clauses (i) and (ii) as existential, clause (iii) as copulative. To ease the transition to (iii), W.D. Ross in the Oxford Translation⁷² finds it necessary to repeat the verb 'comes to be':

Everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something.

⁷⁰ Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione*, tr. with notes (Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford 1982) ix-xv, cf. p.83.

⁷¹ Gottlob Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884) §53; my example 'Tame tigers exist' comes from an often cited debate between W. Kneale and G.E. Moore

on the question 'Is existence a predicate?' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary vol. 15 (1936) 154-88; G.E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* (London and New York 1959) 115-26).

⁷² *The Works of Aristotle Translated into English*, 8: *Metaphysica* (2nd edn, Oxford 1928).

This is exactly parallel to the way English has to render Burnet's construal of *Apology* 30b. Would De Strycker and Slings object to Ross's translation of Aristotle? If so, Aristotle would object to their objection, since it would be philosophically disastrous for him to admit that the transition to (iii) involved a change of meaning.

Immediately after the sentence quoted, Aristotle explains point (iii):

τὸ δὲ τὶ λέγω καθ' ἐκάστην κατηγορίαν· ἢ γὰρ τόδε ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πού.

I mean 'something' in accordance with each category: <everything comes to be> either a so-and-so or so much or so qualified or somewhere.

He has (iii) cover all four categories in which change can occur, including the category of substance. All are γίνεσθαι τι, because what he usually calls γίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς is now a special case of γίνεσθαι τι. Ross's English captures the whole formula with the single verb 'comes to be', but he has to write the verb twice because his *Sprachgefühl* tells him (rightly, I am sure) that 'comes to be something' is a different meaning from 'comes to be' *simpliciter*.⁷³ But ancient Greek allows Aristotle to write γίγνεται once only to produce a formula that will cover all the four types of change he recognizes. In the next chapter of *Metaphysics* 7, restating the doctrine quoted (1033a 24-7), Aristotle himself repeats the verb γίνεσθαι for (iii), just like Ross. Evidently, it makes no difference to him how the point is expressed.

Can we give a concrete example to show how Aristotle conceives the structure of substantial coming to be? There is no problem in the case of non-substantial change: 'Socrates comes to be musical from being unmusical, by the agency of his teacher Damon' can be said while the process is going on. But 'Socrates comes to be a human from the menses of Phainarete, by the agency of Sophroniscus', if said while the process is still going on, makes it sound as if Socrates pre-exists himself. For the name 'Socrates' has no application until Socrates has come to be. The solution is to put it in the past tense, as we usually do: 'Socrates came to be (was born) in 469 BC'. Aristotle will now ask, 'What did Socrates come to be?', and will answer 'a human being' (*Metaph.* 7.7.1032a 18), or perhaps 'a rational two-footed animal'. Sometimes he will change the subject and speak of matter coming to be a human being, or more abstractly, of a potential human coming to be an actual one. But these philosophical technicalities do not belong in the grammatical analysis of an ordinary Greek verb. The fact remains that Aristotle's use of εἶναι ἀπλῶς and γίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς does not correspond well to our use of 'exist' and 'come to exist'. It would be nonsense to add 'unqualifiedly' (ἀπλῶς) to 'exists' or 'comes to exist' in an attempt to English εἶναι or γίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς. Aristotle's addition of ἀπλῶς implies that in his vocabulary it is one and the same verb that is used, first without, and then with, a complement.

Now given that (iii) covers the predicates acquired in all four categorially different types of change, the quoted formula is, by Aristotle's lights, quadruply ambiguous. γίνεσθαι is πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (*Phys.* 1.7.190a 31-b 1), so the meaning of γίνεσθαι varies with the category

⁷³ Much less happy is H. Tredennick's Loeb translation (London and Cambridge, MA 1933): 'Everything which is generated is generated by something and from something and becomes something.' The best German translation, that of Michael Frede and Günther Patzig, *Aristoteles 'Metaphysik Z': Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar* (2 vols, Munich 1988), has 'Aber alles, was entsteht, entsteht unter Einwirkung von etwas, wird aus etwas und wird zu etwas.' They too find it necessary to change the verb. The most widely cited French translation is J. Tricot, *Aristote: La Métaphysique*, new tr. and notes (new edn, Paris 1953), where we read 'Tout ce qui

devient, devient, par quelque chose et à partir de quelque chose, quelque chose.' This mirrors the Greek nicely, thanks to the fact that 'devenir' is rarely existential in meaning (here I am indebted to advice from Francis Wolff). A similar effect can be achieved in English by changing the word-order: 'Everything that comes to be comes to be something, from something, by the agency of something', which, like the French, is most naturally heard as confined to non-substantial change. The drawback is that this English, like that French, fails to capture the whole of what Aristotle intends.

of predicate acquired through the change. What the compendious formula teaches us, however, is that for Aristotle the ἀπλῶς use of γίνεσθαι, like the ἀπλῶς use of εἶναι, is further completable – by a predicate in the category of substance.

I can now offer a formal argument. Premise (1): Ross's unease with the transition to (iii) shows that Williams is right about his own language, English – when 'comes to be' is used without a complement, 'to be' has an existential meaning which resists further completion. Premise (2): Aristotle is right about his own Greek – 'x γίγνεται' is a complete statement which is yet further completable, even when the subject is a newly created substance. That is, even when x γίγνεται ἀπλῶς, the result of the process is not to be expressed by a statement 'x ἐστὶ' in which ἐστὶ has an existential meaning that resists further completion. When Socrates ἐγένετο ἀπλῶς, he ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος and both ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς and ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος became true of him. Conclusion: between Aristotle and Williams, language changed.

This need not mean that Greek changed, or any natural language. Maybe all that happened was that philosophy and theology came to be pursued in modern European languages instead of Latin and Greek. The question turns on whether either ancient language acquired a verb for existence that is grammatically uncompletable in the manner of our 'x exists'. ὑπάρχειν fails the test, because (as already noted) it retained a predicative use parallel to copulative εἶναι.⁷⁴ So too, for that matter, did *ex(s)tare* and *ex(s)istere* in Latin.⁷⁵ Certainly there are contexts in which ὑπάρχειν demands an existential translation. But the same is true of εἶναι. Consider this example of post-classical Greek:

ὥστε εἴπερ εἰσὶ θεοί, φθαρτοὶ εἰσιν. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσίν. εἶγε μὴν ἐστὶ θεός, ζῶιόν ἐστιν... (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.141-2)

The result [*sc.* of the preceding argument] is that if there are gods, they are perishable. Therefore there are not gods. Again, if there is a god, it is an animal ...

The arguments are undoubtedly about (what we call) existence, but Sextus continues to treat εἶναι as complete but further completable, adding and dropping predicates at will. He could have substituted ὑπάρχουσι for εἰσὶ throughout.⁷⁶ The best candidate in ancient Greek for existence pure and simple is ὑφίστασθαι, ὑφεστηκέναι and the associated noun ὑπόστασις. A passive verb cannot take a predicative complement.

Yet even if Galen is wrong when he remarks that the Greeks have recently come to use ὑφεστηκέναι for the same conception (ἔννοια) as they have long used εἶναι and ὑπάρχειν (*Inst. Log.* 3, p.7.19-22),⁷⁷ it may be doubted whether uncompletable is enough to make ὑφεστηκέναι correspond to modern verbs for existence. Epicurus tells his followers that in all their actions they should reckon with τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς τέλος (ΚΔ 22): he is not referring to whatever actual end they have in view, but to the *real* or underlying purpose (the avoidance of pain and disturbance) that should control all their conduct.⁷⁸ Again, the three Neoplatonic ὑποστάσεις are not the only things that exist, but different levels of *reality* to which various existing things may be assigned. In principle, one class of things could be more of a reality (ὑπόστασις μᾶλλον) than another

⁷⁴ And continued to do so into late antiquity, beyond the authors cited n.51 above: witness Hesychius s.v. σῶς: ὁ ὀλόκληρος, καὶ τέλειος. ὁ σωζόμενος, καὶ σῶς ὑπάρχων (example owed to Michael Frede).

⁷⁵ Examples: Lucr. 3.97; Cic. *De Orat.* 2.54.217.

⁷⁶ As at *Math.* 10.4 he substitutes predicative ὑπάρχειν for the εἶναι he used in virtually the same sentence at *Pyr.* 3.124. For this and other examples of the interchangeability of the two verbs in Sextus, see Karel

Janáček, *Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus* (Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis, 1948) 42-4.

⁷⁷ Is Galen updating Aristotle's statement (*APr.* 1.36.48b 2-4) that ὑπάρχειν is said in as many ways as εἶναι?

⁷⁸ Cf. the translations 'real purpose' in Cyril Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains* (Oxford 1926), 'il fine realmente dato' in Graziano Arrighetti, *Epicuro, Opere: Introduzione, traduzione e note* (Turin 1967).

(Plotinus VI 1 [42] 29, 18).⁷⁹ Existence, by contrast with reality, is an all-or-nothing concept. A thing either exists or it does not,⁸⁰ and it is nonsense to say that one thing exists *more* than another.

Another problem with the group ὑφίστασθαι, ὑφεστηκέναι, ὑπόστασις, is how far they differ significantly from ὑπάρχειν, ὑπαρξίς. In discussion of this issue much weight – too much weight, I believe – has been put on a celebrated claim by Chrysippus to the effect that the present alone can be said to ὑπάρχειν, not the past and the future, which should be allowed only to ὑφεστηκέναι.⁸¹ Whichever of the conflicting translations and interpretations of this precious testimony we prefer,⁸² we must agree that the two verbs stand here in contrast to each other. But elsewhere, and often, they do not. Sextus argues (*Math.* 8.338) that if the human species does not exist, nor does Socrates: ἀνθρώπου μὴ ὑπάρχοντος οὐδὲ Σωκράτης ὑφέστηκεν. Alexander emphasizes (*Alex. Aphr. In Apr.* 4.9-11) the importance of grasping when things that differ in their essential being (κατ’ οὐσίαν), such as form and matter, are nonetheless inseparable in actual existence: τῆι ὑποστάσει τε καὶ ὑπαρξίει. It would be no easy matter to fix the range and nuances of the ὑπόστασις group.⁸³

Rather than pursue these complications further, I close with a suggestion. Perhaps it is a mistake to expect *any* ancient Greek verb to match our ‘to exist’. Perhaps what needs explaining is not the absence of a specialized verb for existence in ancient Greek and Latin, but its presence in modern European languages. Even in English ‘to exist’ was a late-comer: the earliest citation in the *OED* is 1602, with the comment: ‘The late appearance of the word is remarkable: it is not in Cooper’s Lat.-Eng. Dict. 1565, either under *existo* or *exto*.’⁸⁴ Similarly, Étienne Gilson in his classic work *L’Être et l’Essence* speaks of the French ‘exister’ taking root only in the seventeenth century.⁸⁵ Given the anti-Scholastic mood of the early modern period, an uncompletable verb might have been welcomed as a neat way of blocking Aristotelian questions before they could arise.

None of this impugns Frege’s great insight. That is independent of the way one language or another expresses (what we call) existence. From his point of view, any language that can express inferences involving propositions of the form ‘Some *F* is *G*’ (is there any language that cannot?) is talking about existence, even if it lacks a word specifically devoted to its expression. For ‘Some *F* is *G*’ on his analysis means ‘There exists at least one *x* such that *x* is both *F* and *G*’. In logical notation, $(\exists x)(Fx \wedge Gx)$. Frege’s is a logic of thought, not of language.

⁷⁹ Admittedly, Plotinus is attacking the Stoics here, not expounding his own philosophy, and I know no other place in Plotinus where ὑπόστασις admits of degrees. But compare, in the same treatise, μάλλον ὄν (26, 8), μάλλον οὐσίας (27, 37), μάλλον εἶη (28, 16), μάλλον οὐκ ὄν (29, 24). My concern is with language, not philosophy, and one case is enough to establish the grammatical *possibility* of grading ὑπόστασις in the same way as οὐσία.

⁸⁰ Cf. n.42 above.

⁸¹ Stob. *Ecl.* 1.106.18-23W = *SVF* 2.509 = LS 51B (4); Plut. *Comm. not.* 1081f = *SVF* 2.518 = LS 51C (5).

⁸² For a judicious treatment of the texts and the debate they have prompted, see Malcolm Schofield, ‘The retrenchable present’, in Jonathan Barnes and Mario Mignucci (eds), *Matter and Metaphysics* (Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, Naples 1988) 329-74.

⁸³ The basic study by H. Dörrie, ‘Υπόστασις: Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte’, *Gött. Nachr.*, Philol.-hist. Kl. 1955, 35-92, is not superseded by the essays in Romano and Taormina (n.52), which mostly focus on what the words are applied *to* rather than on the prior

issue of the meaning in virtue of which they can be so applied; in Fregean terms, on reference instead of sense. As a result, they deliver much arcane metaphysico-theological doctrine, but (apart from Glucker) scant linguistic analysis; doctrinal differences are one thing, semantic differences another. More promising is the approach taken by Damascius, *De Principiis* 2.74.23-77.24 Westerink (= Ruelle Vol. 1, ch.62): he compares εἶναι with six other Greek verbs for ‘to be’ (ὑφεστάναι, ὑπάρχειν, τελέθειν, πέλειν, σώζεσθαι, τυγχάνειν), arguing that they differ in meaning both from εἶναι and from each other even though they share uses, including an existential use, in common. Better still would be treatment by the methods of transformational grammar, which replace (and thereby illuminate) ontology in Kahn (n.33: 1973) and epistemology in John Lyons, *Structural Semantics: An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato* (Oxford 1963).

⁸⁴ *OED* (2nd edn, Oxford 1989) s.v.

⁸⁵ Paris 1948, 15. I thank Michael Screech for checking French lexicographical resources to confirm that Gilson’s claim is substantially correct.

BECOMING IN PLATO

Now imagine Plato reading the *Metaphysics*. He will not see quadruple ambiguity in the formula we examined from 7.7 (p.18 above), because he does not subscribe to the Aristotelian theory of categories. When he distinguishes types of change (*Tht.* 181cd, *Laws* 10.893c ff.), this has no semantic consequences. They are species of change in the same way as dogs and horses are two species of animal, in one and the same sense of 'animal'. So in principle Plato can accept Aristotle's formula as unambiguously true.

He certainly accepts point (i): see *Timaeus* 28a 4-6. He seems to accept (ii) as well, at least sometimes: see *Phaedo* 70c ff. There is no need to discuss these texts in detail, because for our purposes the interesting question is his attitude to (iii). Does he agree that everything that comes to be comes to be something?

The place to start is the well-known Platonic contrast between the sensible world as the realm of becoming (γένεσις) and the ideal world of Forms as the realm of being (οὐσία). There is a straightforward statement of the contrast at *Timaeus* 27d-28a, but this presupposes readers who already understand what it amounts to. So let us go back to the *Republic*, where the contrast is first introduced at the beginning of Book 6, with direct reference to the argument from Book 5 we discussed earlier, which has just reached its conclusion that the lovers of sights and sounds lack knowledge and are not philosophers (479d-480a).⁸⁶ By way of introduction to the next point, Socrates sums up the preceding argument with a long 'since'-clause (484b 3-6) which explains why the lovers of sights and sounds are not philosophers. The reason is that philosophers are those who are able to grasp 'that which is always identically the same' (οἱ τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι), whereas the lovers of sights and sounds 'wander among things that are many and that vary in every sort of way' (οἱ ἐν ... πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχυουσιν πλανώμενοι). Already, 'that which is always identically the same' fills out and clarifies Book 5's (deliberately) indeterminate phrasing 'what is' or 'what purely is'.⁸⁷ A page later (485a 10-b 3), Socrates characterizes philosophers as passionately keen on any study that will show them something of 'that being which always is and does not wander under the influence of becoming and destruction' (ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὐσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς). This is clearer still. But it leaves us with an important question: what kind of becoming and destruction is he talking about?

It is true that the Forms are eternal. They neither come into existence nor pass away. But it is equally true that they never change in any respect. In the Book 5 argument, which Socrates is summarizing, there was not a word about sensibles coming into existence and passing away. It was all about their changing from beautiful to ugly, large to small, and so on. We should hold on to this relation with the Book 5 argument as we read through Books 6 and 7, where Plato gradually builds up the contrast between, on the one hand, the unchanging intelligible Forms, and on the other, the sensible world understood as the realm of γένεσις or τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον.⁸⁸ Plato is not just emphasizing that the things around us come into being and pass

⁸⁶ The Theory of Forms itself was first introduced earlier in Book 5 at 475e-476d. But that passage has none of the subsequent emphasis on the changeability of sensible things.

⁸⁷ I say 'deliberately' because the Book 5 argument was designed to soothe the lovers of sights and sounds and persuade them that they lack knowledge, without blatantly telling them that, from an epistemological point of view, they are sick (476d 8-e 2). To this end, Socrates

kept his hand close to his chest, not revealing until later the full import of the various admissions he secured from his interlocutors, who refuse to accept the existence of Forms. For a pioneering account of what the argument with the lovers of sights and sounds does and does not presuppose, see J.C. Gosling, 'Δόξα and δόναμις in Plato's *Republic*', *Phronesis* 13 (1968) 119-30.

⁸⁸ 6.508d 7, 7.521d 4, e 3, 525b 5, 526e 7, 527b 5-6, 534a 3.

away. He is as much or more – I believe more – concerned with their predicative changeability.⁸⁹ We cannot make sense of a basic theme of Plato’s philosophy unless we see that his generalizing use of *γένεσις* and *γιγνόμενα* is as compendious as the Aristotelian formula discussed above. For both philosophers, the verb *γίγνεσθαι* treats all forms of change alike.

Indeed, when Plato wants to be crystal clear that he is speaking of what Aristotle calls *γίγνεσθαι ἀπλῶς*, he is prepared to write it out in full as *γενέσθαι ὄν* (*Soph.* 245d 1-2): just as to be is to be (predicatively) a being/ something that is (*εἶναι ὄν*), so to come to be is to come to be a being/ something that is. To which he adds (245d 4) that whenever something comes to be, at that moment it has come to be a whole (*τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον*). Never mind the philosophical import of these strange remarks.⁹⁰ My interest is in their grammar and the way predicates like *ὄν* and *ὅλον* can be added on to *γίγνεσθαι* even in places where our inclination would be to translate existentially.

A final passage to pit Burnet against his critics, this time on text as well as translation, is *Phaedrus* 245d 1-3. In his OCT it reads as follows:

ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μὴδ’ ἐξ ἐνός· εἰ γὰρ ἕκ του γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο.

A first principle cannot come into being. For everything that comes to be necessarily comes to be from a first principle, but a first principle necessarily does not come to be from anything – for if it were to come to be from something, it would no longer come to be a first principle.

The crux is the last five words, where the leading MSS have οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. Editors who follow the MSS have a hard time explaining the logic,⁹¹ whereas Burnet’s text is logically pellucid: by definition, a principle that comes to be *from something* can no longer count as a first principle.⁹² Fortunately, the nominative ἀρχή or ἔτι ἀρχή is vouched for by Cicero (*Rep.* 6.27, *Tusc.* 1.54), Iamblichus (*In Nic.* 79.3-4 Pistelli), and ‘Timaeus Locrus’ (*ap.* Theodoret. *Therap.* 2.108 Raeder), all of them earlier than any extant support for ἐξ ἀρχῆς.⁹³ I offer the OCT version as another example of Burnet rightly recognizing a Platonic sentence in which *γίγνεσθαι* appears complete on its own, only to be further completed in the next clause.

THE TRANSLATION AGAIN

I conclude that the ambiguity of which De Strycker and Slings complain would be lost on Plato. Quite simply, the addition of a complement to *γίγνεται* in the second member of the antithesis at *Apology* 30b 2-3, as required on Burnet’s construal, would not strike Plato as a change in the meaning of the verb. Like *εἶναι*, *γίγνεσθαι* is open to further completion. My point is not that Plato needs to be consciously aware of this fact, but that *we* have to be consciously aware that our categories may fail to apply to ancient Greek. Of all anachronisms, anachronism in grammar is the most insidious.

⁸⁹ For more on this subject, from a different angle, see Michael Frede, ‘Being and becoming in Plato’, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Supplementary vol. 1988, 37-52.

⁹⁰ There are parallels at *Parm.* 153c 7-e 3. My construal of the *Sophist* passage follows F.M. Cornford, *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge* (London 1935) 225 n.2 and 226.

⁹¹ Compare the varying translations and notes in, e.g., Léon Robin’s Budé edition (Paris 1947); G.J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* (Amsterdam

1969) 122-3; C.J. Rowe, *Plato: Phaedrus* with tr. and comm. (Warminster 1986).

⁹² The context makes clear that the principle we are discussing is the ultimate first principle of all movement.

⁹³ See Burnet’s *apparatus*, or the fuller one in Robin, which quotes several proposed emendations. Cicero translates, ‘nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde’. Note how he puts the consequent of the conditional first, because the passive ‘gigneretur’ cannot take a complement to match Plato’s ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο.

Thus point (2) of the De Strycker-Slings objection fails. It is an anachronistic retrojection of our own grammatical structures. Point (1) was the claim that the parallelism of the two pointedly antithetical members requires that the disputed sentence could be ended with χρήματα, and that καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κτλ. should be considered an afterthought. But on its own this is mere assertion, which carries no weight without the support of the other two objections. Burnet's new construal leaves the sentence as antithetical as it was before. It simply offers a different, and philosophically more significant, antithesis than the traditional translation. Socrates has just said that all he ever does is go around Athens urging people to change their priorities. Instead of giving their attention to the accumulation of money, neglecting their own soul, they should put the state of their soul ahead of the state of their bodies or their bank accounts (29d-30b). On either translation, our sentence explains why people should take him seriously. But Burnet's version, I have argued, is both linguistically unimpeachable and philosophically superior. Unlike the standard translation, it fits Plato's overall portrait of Socrates.

HYPERBATON

It remains to address the separation of ἅπαντα from its noun phrase χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Hyperbaton, a disruption of the expected order of words, is common enough in Plato not to need illustration here.⁹⁴ Quantifiers like ἅπαντα and numerical adjectives (e.g. τριττά in my next quotation) are especially liable to be displaced from their expected position. All we need now is a *reason* for delaying ἅπαντα at *Apology* 30b. I suggest it is the rhetorical emphasis gained by juxtaposing ἅπαντα to καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίου: 'Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue money and other things come to be good for human beings – yes, *all* other things, both in private and in public life.'

On this construal, the emphatic ἅπαντα delivers its strongest punch in the final phrase, 'and in public life'. So far from καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κτλ. being an afterthought, as De Strycker and Slings describe it, those words lead to a climax that will sound deeply offensive to the Athenian demos, whom Socrates will soon counter-charge with rampant injustice in their public life (31d-32c).⁹⁵ To this charge he adds another: Athenian politics does not follow the Socratic order of priorities, which would mean putting the wisdom and moral character of the community ahead of its wealth and power (36cd). These later passages help to establish the *tone* of the disputed sentence. Imagine the sentence delivered aloud with a pause just before ἀγαθά to begin the final crescendo.⁹⁶ The meaning would be clear, and clearly insulting, to all lovers of democracy. Very different from the bland and implausible message of the standard translation, that cultivating virtue will make you better off in worldly terms.

The diagnosis of hyperbaton leaves ἀγαθά free to serve as predicate to the subject τὰ ἄλλα ... ἅπαντα. The row of neuter plurals should not disturb. The TLG reveals no other instance in Plato of the collocation τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθά, whereas hyperbaton amid neuter plurals is not unique. Witness *Republic* 9.581c 3-4:

⁹⁴ There is a section on hyperbaton in the 'Digest of Platonic idioms' affixed to the Rev. James Riddell's edition of the *Apology* (Oxford 1877; repr. *separatim* Amsterdam 1967), and many examples from Plato in J.D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford 1952) ch.3, 'The order of words'; a recent, more theoretical treatment, again with numerous examples from Plato, is A.M. Devine and L.D. Stephens, *Discontinuous Syntax: Hyperbaton in Greek* (New York and Oxford 2000). From antiquity we have a superb account of the rhetorical effectiveness of hyperbaton in Longinus, *On the*

Sublime 22. The technical term ὑπερβατόν occurs already in Plato, *Prot.* 343e 3, in a context which assumes that readers need no elaborate explanation of what it is.

⁹⁵ On the *Apology* as both defence and counter-accusation, see my 'The impiety of Socrates', *Ancient Philosophy* 17 (1997) 1-12, repr. in Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (eds), *The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies* (New York and Oxford 2002) 133-45.

⁹⁶ So Taylor (n.12) 51.

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόδικον, φιλοκερδέες;

where Adam translates ‘And for this reason we say that the primary classes of men are also three in number, etc.’, and comments,

I take τριττὰ as predicative: the hyperbaton is not, I think, a difficult one, because the stress of the voice falls on τριττὰ, and to my ear it sounds more idiomatic than τὰ πρῶτα γένη τριττὰ εἶναι would be.⁹⁷

Or *Laws* 7.798d 1-2:

τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ἐλάττω μεταβαλλόμενα κακὰ διεργάζοιτ’ ἄν,

where the subject of the verb is τὰ ἄλλα μεταβαλλόμενα, the object ἐλάττω κακὰ: ‘Other changes would produce lesser evils.’ A neat example of what Burnet meant by ‘interlaced order’.⁹⁸

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⁹⁷ James Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, ed. with critical notes, comm. and appendices (Cambridge 1902) *ad loc.*

⁹⁸ As already intimated (n.37 above), this essay was originally designed for a Russian audience more familiar with the standard rendering from the translation by Michail Solov’ev than with Burnet’s commentary or recent scholarly literature on the philosophically all-important Greek verb ‘to be’. I owe a very great debt to my translator, Irina Levinskaya, for making me explain each unfamiliar point as clearly as possible, to produce an argument that would be satisfactory to us both in either language. (The Russian version, attentive to their translations of all the crucial texts, is due to appear in 2003 in a collection of articles put out by the Philosophy Faculty

of St Petersburg University.) At a later stage I benefited from discussion and correspondence with J.N. Adams, Susanne Bobzien, Luc Brisson, Lesley Brown, David Charles, John Cooper, Bruce Fraser, Jaako Hintikka, Edward Hussey, Charles Kahn, Calvin Normore, Dominic Scott, Lucas Siorvanes, Michael Stokes and William Taschek, and from M.L. West’s lectures on Greek accentuation; from the opportunity to present the sections on Aristotle at the Fifteenth Symposium Aristotelicum (devoted to *Gen. corr.* 1) in Deurme, Holland in 1999; from a wide-ranging discussion the same year in the Classics Department at Toronto, followed up by a vigorous letter from Brad Inwood; and from a friendly exchange of views with S.R. Slings.